Judicial Assault on Child Victims: An Unintended Impact of Child Protection Laws by Sayvetz, Ann & Shink, Shari
Denver Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 3 Symposium - Children's Law Article 8 
February 2021 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ann Sayvetz & Shari Shink, Judicial Assault on Child Victims: An Unintended Impact of Child Protection 
Laws, 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 499 (1992). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON CHILD VICTIMS:




Dedicated to L.S. and A.L.G., whose cases were
the catalyst for this Article
I. PROLOGUE
This Article explores statutory and case law which address the ques-
tion of disclosure of medical records pertaining to physical and psycho-
logical evidence in cases involving adult victims, child victims and the
accused in a variety of settings. Inconsistent results in Colorado give
rise to the concerns expressed in this Article. Specifically, both child
and adult victims have a right to assert a privilege and prevent disclosure
of their confidential medical records when a case is brought in the crimi-
nal setting. If, however, a case is brought in the context of a depen-
dency and neglect (D and N) proceeding or a criminal case subsequent to a
report of abuse made under the Children's Code, the privilege appears
not to exist. Additionally, even though the statute appears to also elimi-
nate the privilege for the alleged perpetrator, in practice, only the
child's records are sought. One is left with the question of why the Chil-
dren's Code, the purpose of which is to protect children, provides this
class of victims with the least protection in judicial proceedings.I
These problems first come to light when social services attorneys or
District Attorneys (representing the county or state) and parents' de-
fense attorneys in D and N custody or criminal cases request or sub-
poena medical records from health care institutions and professionals
without proper consent. 2 Whether to produce these records or to assert
the patient's privilege is an extremely difficult decision for the provider
because there is conflicting guidance in the law. An improper disclosure
can have grave consequences for the subject of the records;3 not to men-
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1. For an excellent in-depth discussion of protected communications, see Robert
Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected
Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143 (1984).
2. The authors caution members of the bar, health care providers and record custo-
dians that a subpoena only triggers the question of whether disclosure is proper; it does
not obviate the need for an appropriate consent, court order or determination that consent
is unnecessary. Otherwise, testimonial privileges, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987
& Supp. 1991), would be meaningless whenever a subpoena issued for such information.
3. Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (the physician-pa-
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tion the risk to the integrity of the legal proceeding4 and the provider
who makes the wrong choice.
5
Disclosure of medical records in response to a request or subpoena
is not determinative of whether the records will be admissible as evi-
dence in the subsequent judicial proceeding. However, the health care
professional's obligation to assert the patient's privilege attaches at the
point of the initial request for disclosure, and the law will provide pro-
tection at this point.6 This Article focuses on the disclosure quandary,
although admissibility of records are discussed where pertinent. The
tensions between privilege and disclosure are addressed below in the
context of D and N, criminal, civil and domestic relations (custody)
cases. The inconsistency of outcomes is explored and suggestions for a
more uniform approach are made below.
II. DEPENDENCY AND NEGLECT CASES
Cases of abuse, ill treatment, physical or medical neglect of children
are regulated by the Colorado Children's Code. 7 In these cases, county
departments of social services or local law enforcement agencies investi-
gate reports of suspected abuse or neglect.8 Often medical records are
sought in order to establish the nature of the child's injury, abuse, ne-
glect or trauma (mental or physical). The Code is silent as to whether
such records are to be disclosed to the investigators by health care prov-
iders or records custodians. Individual professional licensing laws gen-
erally prohibit disclosure.9 The Children's Code, however, abrogates
these privileges such that communications between a minor patient and
provider are admissible as evidence in any case resulting from a report
of child abuse or neglect.' 0 The statutory language is broad enough to
tient relationship and information acquired from that relationship are extremely private
matters for which a high degree of protection is warranted).
4. See, e.g., id. at 865 (improper admission of testimony which could have influenced
the verdict is reversible error).
5. For example, unauthorized release of confidential information may result in civil
liability for invasion of privacy, Levias v. United Air Lines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 978 (M.D. Ala.
1974), as well as criminal liability, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-412(1), (3) (1986 & Supp.
1991) (unauthorized disclosure of medical records is a class 6 felony theft); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-4-1409(20) (Supp. 1991) (unauthorized release of HIV information is a
misdemeanor).
6. Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1983) (once medical communications
privileges attach, they prohibit both pretrial discovery of information as well as testimonial
disclosure). See also Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991).
7. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-101 to -702 (Supp. 1991), see especially definitions in
§ 19-3-102(1) (Supp. 1991).
8. Id. § 19-3-308(l).
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-9 0-107(l)(g) (1987) (privilege for psychologists and
persons working under the supervision of a psychologist); id. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987 &
Supp. 1991) (protected communications with physician, surgeon or registered profes-
sional nurse); id. § 12-43-218(1) (1991) (nondisclosure by psychologists, social workers,
marriage and family therapists, professional counselors and certified school
psychologists).
10. Colorado Revised Statute § 19-3-311 provides that such communications are not
privileged evidentiary matter:
The incident of privileged communication between patient and physician, be-
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address communications and observations of both physical and psycho-
logical harm. If the privilege cannot bar testimony, it follows that the
records may properly be disclosed in advance of the judicial proceed-
ing, I I and therefore production in response to a request or subpoena
appears to be authorized, if not compelled, by the statute.
This abrogation of the patient's right to assert a privilege as to testi-
mony about certain communications is a companion to the statutory
duty of providers to report suspected child abuse. 12 However, the iden-
tity of the "patient" in this statute is ambiguous: is it the victim or the
accused or both? The presumed purpose of this abrogation is to en-
hance the reporting of child abuse and to prevent the accused from hid-
ing behind the privilege and thereby conceal admissions or physical
evidence needed to determine what happened to the child. 13 On the
other hand, the respondent often seeks the child's records in order to
establish the child's lack of credibility, propensity to not tell the truth, or
to give inconsistent accounts. In these cases, the alleged perpetrator,
who should not be permitted to hide his or her own conduct behind the
shield of privilege, seeks to use the statutory exemption to the child's
privilege as a sword, to attack and undermine the child's testimony.
In the authors' experience, however, this section is relied upon by
attorneys and providers to justify disclosure of a child's entire medical
record. 14 This paradox thwarts society's desire to protect the child
15
and instead exposes the minor victim to further assault in a judicial fo-
rum, either in person through cross examination or by proxy if a profes-
sional testifies about the victim's statements as a permitted exception to
the hearsay rule. 16
tween patient and registered professional nurse, or between any person licensed
pursuant to article 43 of title 12, C.R.S. [psychologists, social workers, therapists
and other counselors], or certified school psychologist and client, which is the
basis for a [abuse or neglect] report [required to be filed] pursuant to section 19-
3-304, shall not be a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding
resulting from a [filed] report ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-311(1) (Supp. 1991).
11. See Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 11 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (where a party intends
to present testimony as to mental or physical condition, the substance of such testimony
may be required to be disclosed prior to trial). SeeJett v. State of Florida, WL 226466 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting defendant's discovery of child victim's communications
with therapist under similar statute).
12. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (Supp. 1991).
13. See, e.g., In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 1990) (disclosure of mother's past mental
health records); In re M.S., 569 N.E.2d 1282 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (mother's medical records
admissible in termination case); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(mother's drug treatment records disclosed in addicted infant D & N case); Common-
wealth v. Arnold, 514 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (defendant convicted of sexual as-
sault was not permitted to assert privilege for inculpatory communications to a social
worker).
14. The betrayal of trust by disclosure of a child's statements about a parent with
whom the child still seeks a healthy relationship subjects the child to substantial distress.
See Weisberg & Wald, supra note I, at 211 n.215; Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 39-
40 (Colo. 1984).
15. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102 (Supp. 1991) (generally, the legislative declara-
tions of the general assembly demonstrate an intent to advance the welfare and best inter-
ests of an abused or neglected child).
16. A proxy is a professional who testifies about the child victim's statements in lieu of
1992]
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It is important to note at this juncture that the authors assume, for
purposes of this Article, that D and N cases involve injury allegedly
caused by persons related to or known by the child, because the respon-
dents in these proceedings are parents who have either caused harm to
the child or have failed to protect a child from harm by another. In D
and N cases therefore, the child's testimony often is to be used against
the parent. How is the need for information in a proceeding to establish
mistreatment or neglect of a child to be balanced with the child's need
to confide in a health care professional and begin the process of physical
and psychological recovery? Where the victim's physical or mental con-
dition is a crucial component of such proceedings, evidence of same ap-
pears to be appropriate. The Colorado Court of Appeals has held there
was no physician's privilege as to physical evidence because a report to
Social Services constituted an automatic waiver.
17
There do not appear to be any published Colorado cases addressing
production of a child's post trauma mental health treatment records in a
D and N proceeding.' 8 In Colorado the statutory waiver provides the
basis for disclosure of such records to Social Services and this seems
proper at the investigative stage. However, disclosure to respondents
and/or evidentiary use by the parties at hearing subjects the child to
betrayal of those confidences which the privilege was intended to and
should continue to protect, just as in the case of an adult victim.' 9
If the respondent seeks records of the child abuse investigation by
the county social services agency or other social services records, an in
camera evaluation has been held to be appropriate. 20 If these files con-
tain the child's mental health records, the authors contend a hearing
rather than an in camera inspection is required. There exits a virtually
unknown and certainly under-utilized statute which establishes a hearing
procedure to determine whether mental health records should be re-
leased 2 1 in the absence of a valid consent or other specified circum-
the child's testimony. In Colorado, such testimony has been allowed through use of the
residual hearsay exception (CoLo. R. EVID. 803(24) (Supp. 1991)). See Oldsen v. People,
732 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Colo. 1986) (child's hearsay statements related by psychologist, phy-
sician and social worker had sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to sup-
port admission).
17. In re T.S. and T.M., 781 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, Oct. 10,
1989, (automatic waiver of mother's privilege).
18. In D and N cases from other states, the courts have denied fathers' requests for
Social Services and mental health records of a child. E.g., In re D.G., 416 A.2d 77 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). Courts have also denied requests for a child's statements
made to a treating therapist. E.g, In re Daniel C.H., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 624 (Ct. App. 1990).
Such access has also been denied in delinquency cases. E.g., In re L.P., 593 A.2d 393 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (notes of school psychologist protected by confidentiality).
19. See Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 39-40 (Colo. 1984) (protective orders
may be issued when appropriate to prevent disclosure of communications); infra Section
III, discussion regarding criminal cases.
20. People v. District Court, 743 P.2d 432, 436 (Colo. 1987) (in camera review re-
quired where the accused party who seeks access has proven an exception to confidential-
ity applies).
21. Colorado Revised Statute § 27-10-120(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section [disclosure of information
regarding a criminal defendant or crimes], all information obtained and records
[Vol. 69:3
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stances.2 2 This shall, for purposes of this Article, be referred to as a
"27-10-120" hearing. This statute requires a hearing of which the subject
of the record and the custodian must be given notice (in compliance with
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure) and an opportunity to appear.
2 3
The authors theorize that the purposes of requiring notice to the custo-
dian are twofold: first, to allow for assertion of privilege and, second to
give notice to the treating professional. The latter may then also attend
the hearing and offer testimony to the court about the potential harm to
the subject and/or an ongoing therapeutic relationship if the pertinent
records were to be disclosed. This may not always occur in a hearing on
a motion for protective orders under Rule 26(c) of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure. The further value of a 27-10-120 hearing is the
unique necessity of notice to the subject of the record, which is not re-
quired in a hearing on a motion to quash a subpoena (in which the court
is asked to prevent disclosure of documents or testimony). This allows
the subject, the party most affected by the outcome, to be present and
place his or her consent or opposition to disclosure on the record. This
statute is not restricted in its applicability to any particular kind of pro-
ceeding;24 its definitions are broad and cover any mental health serv-
ices.2 5 It would seem very appropriate to use the 27-10-120 proceeding
whenever a request for disclosure of a child's mental health records is
received. The child can be represented and the custodian/provider can
be present to fully advise the court as to the impact of disclosure on the
child.
At this point, the question of consent to release the minor's mental
health records must be considered, since existence of a valid consent
moots the privilege issue and obviates the need for a hearing. Ordina-
rily a parent has legal authority to consent to the release of his or her
child's records. 26 However, in a D and N proceeding, the interests of
the parent and the child often conflict. For this reason, the respondent
parent's consent should not be sufficient for disclosure,2 7 especially
prepared in the course of providing any services under this article [care and treat-
ment of the mentally ill] to individuals under any provision of this article shall be
confidential and privileged matter. Such information and records may be dis-
closed only . . . To persons authorized by an order of the court after notice and
opportunity for hearing to the person to whom the record or information per-
tains and the custodian of the record or information pursuant to the Colorado
rules of civil procedure ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-120(1), (1)(f) (1989).
22. See id. §§ 27-10-120(I)(a)-(e), (g)-(h) (which permit disclosure to other providers,
payors, researchers, courts reviewing commitments and families of adult patients).
23. One New York court denied a motion to compel the release of confidential
records for lack of notice to the records custodian. Susan W. v. Ronald A., 558 N.Y.S.2d
813 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990).
24. When this arises in the criminal context, it assumes constitutional dimensions. See
itfra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-102(1) (1989).
26. Ann Sayvetz, Consent to Treatment and Access to .1linors' Medical Records, 17 Coi.o.
l.wv. 1323, 1324 (1988).
27. Despite the provisions of section 27-10-120(1.5), which permit parent access to
the mental health records of the minor child. See COLO. REV. STrAT. § 27-10-120(l.5)
(1989).
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where the contents of the records may be used to attack the child's cred-
ibility as a weapon in parent's defense. In other words, the release of
the child's information to the parents may well promote the self interest
of the parent; not the best interest of the child. 2 8 The child's interest in
nondisclosure is more compelling than that of the adult, based on the
potential threat to the child's physical and emotional well being.
If the parent in a D and N case is not able to act in the best interests
of the child, who is? The Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.) who is appointed
in D and N cases would appear to play this role.2 9 The G.A.L. may as-
sert the child's privilege to bar disclosure of records.30 However, it is
not clear whether the G.A.L. may waive it, since unlike the child's legal
guardians, the G.A.L. has no authority to make treatment or placement
decisions for the child. If Social Services has been granted temporary
legal custody, the agency could provide a valid consent to release
records to the parents. However, the authors submit that obtaining a
judicial opinion ordering disclosure after a 27-10-120 hearing, which en-
courages provider input, is the wiser course.
If the court is to resolve the matter of disclosure of the child's
records, what standard is to be applied? The courts could look to the
already established statutory standard for a patient's access to his or her
own hospital records: access to notes or psychological records may be
denied if inspection would have a significant negative impact on the pa-
tient. 3 ' This procedure would be consistent with the fundamental pur-
pose of a child protection system.
Sometimes, the facts of a D and N case appear to establish criminal
conduct and a criminal case is filed. The respondent/defendant faces
proceedings in two different settings with different disclosure and dis-
covery rules. The Children's Code not only abrogates the privilege in D
and N cases, but in "any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pur-
suant to this part 3 .... .32 At present, the victim's mental health
records are often available to the parent respondent in the D and N case
under social services' broad discovery policies. The parent-defendant in
the criminal case may already have obtained the records in the D and N
case, or may seek them directly in the criminal case under the provisions
of C.R.S. § 19-3-311. The existence of this statutory language explains
the dearth of Colorado cases addressing disclosure of a child's mental
health records in these circumstances.
Since the language of the Children's Code is ambiguous, the ques-
tion of access to records where the D and N respondent is the "patient"
28. For a discussion oflD & N cases where the parent's interests are elevated above the
child's, see David C. Hoskins, Representation of D & .V Respondents: ,. Balanced Approach, 21
CoLo. LAw. 49 (1992).
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111(1) (Supp. 1991).
30. See id. § 19-3-203(3).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801(l)(a) (1989). The authors believe the opinion re-
quired by this statute as to the significant negative impact of release of records may be
supplied either by the child's therapist or an expert appointed by the court.
32. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-31 i(1) (Supp. 1991) (See supra note 14 for the full text
of this section).
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must be addressed. In one unreported Colorado case experienced by
the authors, the trial court asked the mother to waive the privilege to her
records; in the absence of such waiver, the court drew negative infer-
ences as to the mother's psychological condition. Arguably, the Colo-
rado statute eliminates the privilege, and a waiver by the parent should
not be necessary for disclosure. Although the statute seems to permit it,
the authors are concerned that treatment records of a D and N respon-
dent are seldom sought. Admissions of an alleged perpetrator should
not be shielded by the adult's assertion of a privilege with the provider,
who is otherwise obligated to report suspected abuse. Cases from other
jurisdictions have held that the privilege yields to the paramount inter-
ests of the child.33 Full disclosure of such admissions clearly support
the statutory intent to protect the child.
3 4
III. CRIMINAL CASES
When an adult is the victim of an assault and evidence of physical
harm is to be used, a waiver (either explicit3 5 or implied 36) is required.
Medical records reflecting post-trauma mental health treatment of an
adult victim are privileged and not subject to disclosure to the alleged
perpetrator in a criminal case.3 7 This is true whether the provider is a
psychiatrist, psychologist, nurse or social worker.3 8 Testimony about
the assault and the fact that counselling took place does not constitute a
waiver, and an in camera review of the records by the court has been held
to be inappropriate. 39 The burden of establishing a waiver is on the
party seeking to overcome the privilege and the application of the privi-
lege does not violate the defendant's right of cross examination.
40
Where a child is the victim of an assault by a stranger, the case is
usually reported directly to the police, prosecuted solely as a criminal
case and is not the subject of a report under the Children's Code.
Therefore, the abrogation of privilege in the Children's Code does not
apply, and the child's privilege now remains intact under the state crimi-
nal statutes. Before 1988 the statute on sexual assault on a minor child
stated there was no victim-patient and physician privilege.4 1 In 1988,
the reference to "victim-patient and physician privilege" was deleted
(for any crimes committed after July 1, 1988), thereby resurrecting the
33. Seesupra note 13.
34. To this end, there is also no spousal privilege in child abuse cases. Id. § 19-3-
311(2); see also People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687, 688-89 (Colo. 1983) (applying former
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-112 (1973) in denying spousal privilege).
35. See Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1034, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 1988).
36. Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1983).
37. People v. Silva, 782 P.2d 846, 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
38. See statutes cited supra note 9.
39. Silva, 782 P.2d. at 850.
40. Application of the privilege does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation.
People v. District Court, 719 P.2d at 726-27 (construing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107
(l)(g)(Supp. 1985)).
41. COLO. REV. STAr. § 18-3-411(5) (1986). There is no ambiguity as to identity of
the privilege holder in this statute; the defendant's privilege is not involved.
1992]
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privilege. 4 2 Today, in the case of criminal assault, there is a privilege
protecting the child's records, and the stranger is denied access; but the
relative who commits an assault reported under the Children's Code
may gain access to the child's post-trauma psychological records in the
companion criminal case. 43 This inconsistency is contrary to the public
policy of "child protection", 4 4 and legislation is needed to remedy this
patently differential treatment.
4 5
The privilege pertaining to a child's physical harm may be handled
independently from that of psychological treatment. In one Colorado
case, the mother waived the privilege for the hospital records of her
child's physical examination, but the court held that such explicit waiver
did not include a waiver of the psychologist-patient privilege for treat-
ment at the Kempe National Center for Prevention and Treatment of
Child Abuse.4 6 The child's psychological condition was not an element
of the crimes of sexual assault and sexual assault on a child. Therefore
there was no implicit waiver. There is a danger of ignoring this distinc-
tion when both types of treatment are provided at one institution, and
reflected in a single medical record.
A corollary issue is raised by testimony of a professional about a
criminal assault in lieu of the child victim, under C.R.E. 803(24), 4 7 the
residuary hearsay rule. So long as the scope of testimony is restricted to
"what happened" as opposed to the rehabilitative process of the child,
the substitute testimony should not be deemed a waiver such that all
mental health records would be disclosed. 4 8 The contrary results in an
unconscionable choice: either the child faces the trauma of testifying or
where testimony is inappropriate, disclosure of confidences resulting in
great harm to the therapeutic process.
4 9
The issue most frequently highlighted in such a case is the defend-
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(5) (Supp. 1991). An argument could be made, at
least in sexual assault cases, that the privilege restored to the child-victim pursuant to the
1988 amendment of section 18-3- 411(5) overruled the 1987 Children's Code abrogation
of privilege in section 19-3-311 (1) under the rules of statutory construction: where stat-
utes are irreconcilable, statute passed later in time prevails. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 2-4-206
(1980). The amendment to section 18-3-411(5) was passed in 1988 (1988 Colo. Sess.
Laws 713), while the Children's Code was repealed and reenacted in 1987 (1987 Colo.
Sess. Laws 695).
43. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-311, -308, -303(4.7) (Supp. 1991).
44. See generally id. § 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d) (legislative declarations to promote welfare
and interests of children).
45. This problem has not gone unrecognized by courts addressing similar legislation.
SeeJett v. State of Florida, WL 226466, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (SharpJ, dissent-
ing) ("[A] close relative who rapes a child will have the benefit of requiring disclosure of
the child's statements to his or her psychotherapist, but a stranger who rapes a child under
similar circumstances will have no such right. Such an anomalous and unequal application
of the law should be avoided.").
46. People v. Pressley, 804 P.2d 226, 228 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
47. See supra note 16.
48. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992) (the Supreme Court approved the admissi-
bility of testimony of adults recounting the four year old child's statements about a sexual
assault under established exceptions to the hearsay rule, and rejected the defendant's
Confrontation Clause challenge).
49. See cases cited supra note 18.
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ant's constitutional right to confrontation. 50 In the 1987 case of Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie,5 ' the United States Supreme Court found that
protection of a child's records did not violate the accused's right to con-
frontation. The Court did, however, require an in camera review of the
child's records after which only that information that was exculpatory
was to be disclosed to the defendant. In 1984, Illinois passed a statute
providing an absolute privilege for statements made to rape crisis per-
sonnel. 5 2 The Illinois Supreme Court found the statute did not violate
the defendant's rights to due process or confrontation, and upheld the
trial court's refusal to conduct an in camera hearing to examine the com-
munications. 53 Legislation such as that in Illinois should be considered
in Colorado and elsewhere. In the meantime, the authors contend that
27-10-120 hearings offer greater protection for the child, in part to
avoid the temptation for overworked judges to disclose the entire rec-
ord, rather than engage in the time consuming task of in camera review.
54
We now turn to the question of the criminal defendant as "patient"
in a case arising from a report to Social Services. This in part involves
the question of fairness of disclosure of confidential information of vic-
tim, defendant, neither or both. Where the defendant's medical condi-
tion is not an element of the crime, there is a privilege and a waiver is
required. 55 However, if the criminal case arose out of a report under
the Children's Code, at least under the current law, there may not be a
privilege such that the District Attorney should be able to obtain and
introduce admissions and observations contained in the defendant's
medical records.5 6 This may not, however, extend to records of court
ordered therapy under a treatment plan for sexually abusive parents.
5 7
Further, in criminal cases of assault on a child, there is no spousal privi-
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See EbrahimJ. Kermani, The U.S. Supreme Court on Victim-
ized Children: The Constitutional Rights of the Defendant versus The Best Interest of The Child, 30J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY, 839, 840-42, (1991); see also People v. Reidout,
530 N.Y.S.2d 938, 944 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (court must balance the competing
interests between witness confidentiality in psychiatric records and defendant's right to
confrontation).
51. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (5-4 decision, distinguishing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), which disapproved the trial court's prohibition of cross-examination on the issue
of a witness's prior juvenile record, which was privileged under state law, as a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses).
52. ILL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 8-802.1 (1985).
53. People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988).
54. This was the experience of one author following production to the court of a
child's psychiatric record.
55. Cf People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant's patient-
psychologist privilege was upheld under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(g) (1987)). The
court noted, however, that in Children's Code cases after 1989, statutory amendments
would dictate the opposite result, since psychologists and social workers had been added
to the class of providers whose privilege was abrogated. Bowman, 812 P.2d at 728-29.
56. Credit for this idea is owed to the mother of a child, who, upon being informed by
hospital counsel that her child's records would probably be disclosed to the defendant
accused of sexually assaulting her daughter, without consent, asked why her ex-boyfriend's
group therapy records recounting his admission of the assault would not be available in
the criminal case. See also supra note 45.
57. See People v. District Court, 731 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1987).
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lege, 58 and one parent may have to testify about the other's inculpatory
statements.
IV. CIVIL CASES
In civil cases, parties are entitled to assert a privilege for protection
of medical records, unless the information is the basis of a claim or af-
firmative defense (including emotional distress). 59 This includes drug
and alcohol records, which may only be disclosed with consent or a
court order.60 Where mental health records are sought (other than for a
court ordered evaluation) in any civil matter, it should be presumed by
the provider that the physician/psychologist/social worker privileges ap-
ply.6 1 A 27-10-120 hearing should be utilized, especially where the pa-
tient has or had an expectation of confidentiality.
6 2
The status of the medical communications privilege is less clear in
custody proceedings. The Colorado Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act 63 creates a right of access to the child's medical records for a parent
who has joint legal, 64 but not physical, custody at the time of the medi-
cal records request "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law to the
contrary." 65 However, the "notwithstanding" clause arguably supports
a right of disclosure to a consenting parent whose parental rights have
been terminated. This is patently contrary to the social aims of child
protection, and the statute needs to be amended to make explicit the
right of access applies only in the cases of joint custody.
V. VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION?
It appears from the above discussion that disclosure of medical in-
formation, physical and psychological, varies with the situation. A child
victim of an assault by a stranger or any adult victim has a privilege for
post trauma mental health records, but a child assaulted by a relative or
person known to the child, which is reported under the Children's Code,
does not. This is an unfortunate and unintended byproduct of the stat-
utes designed to protect children. It may well rise to the level of consti-
tutional infirmity: a violation of these children's right to equal
protection of the laws.
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by the federal constitu-
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(a)(II) (Supp. 1991).
59. Clark v. District Ct., 668 P.2d 3, 9-10 (Colo. 1983). Of course, counsel for the
parties will be aware of whether the privilege has been waived because a medical condition
is the basis of a claim or defense, but the provider receiving the request for records will
not know this. For optimal certainty in these situations, counsel should obtain consent or
a judicial determination that the privilege has been waived before requesting records from
the provider.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290 dd-3, ee-3 (1988).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-218(1) (1991).
62. Id. § 12-43-214(l)(d)(4).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-101 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
64. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(1) (1987) (defining joint custody).
65. See id. § 14-10-123.5(7).
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tion.6 6 Generally, the state may not classify groups of persons similarly
situated and treat those classes differently unless the classification is ra-
tional and furthers a legitimate state interest. 6 7 If the affected right is a
fundamental one, or a suspect class has been created, the legislation
must pass a much more rigorous test of judicial scrutiny. 6 8 Where the
state has declared that the purpose of the Children's Code is "[t]o se-
cure for each child subject to [the Code's] provisions such care and gui-
dance... as will best serve his welfare and the interest of society,"'6 9 and
where the application of privilege laws affords the least protection to
this class of children, a court may find the situation deserving of height-
ened scrutiny. Of three groups similarly situated (victims of assault),
one group (minors reported under the Children's Code) has no ability
to protect their confidences necessary for rehabilitation and treatment,
unlike the other two groups (adults and minor victims of assault by
strangers). This disparity and unequal treatment may not withstand a
constitutional challenge, and should therefore be remedied by legisla-
tive or judicial action. In the meantime, the use of 27-10-120 hearings
should result in more equitable and uniform treatment.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The authors recommend the following actions to remedy the ineq-
uities detailed above:
a) Custodians of records and professionals should oppose requests
for production of a child victim's mental health records except to Social
Services in the context of an investigation. If any mental health records
are subpoenaed, the attorney issuing same should be promptly told of
the provider's objection, advised of 27-10-120 procedure, and if the
matter cannot be informally resolved, a motion to quash should be filed.
The custodian should notify and involve providers in the hearing to tes-
tify about potential damage to the child and the therapeutic relationship
based on disclosure. Treatment by psychiatrist, psychologist, social
worker or school counsellor should be handled uniformly. Notice of re-
quest for disclosure should be given to parents/legal guardians and the
child.
b) As long as the current law stands, district attorneys, county at-
torneys and guardians ad litem should consider the use of 19-3-311 to ob-
tain records of respondents and/or defendants in D and N or criminal
cases arising from reports under the Children's Code. Admissions may
be contained therein.
c) District attorneys should use 18-3-411(5) to protect children
from disclosure of psychiatric or psychological treatment records in
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
68. For a recent discussion of equal protection analysis by the Colorado Supreme
Court, see State v. Defoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992) (applying federal law; the Colorado
constitution does not contain an equal protection clause).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(1)(a) (Supp. 1991).
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cases arising outside the Children's Code setting. Also, district attor-
neys should argue that disclosure of the victim's records is inappropriate
in cases of substitute testimony under Colorado Rules of Evidence
803(24).
d) Social Services agencies need to refuse disclosure to D and N
respondents of a child's mental health records unless the court so orders
after a 27-10-120 hearing. Colorado Revised Statute sections 19-1-113
and 114 may be cited as a basis for seeking initial orders against
disclosure.
e) Judges and attorneys should recognize the applicability of the
27-10-120 hearing procedures to production of any mental health
records (whether in D and N, criminal, domestic or civil cases) and use
such hearings (with notice to the custodian of records and the subject of
the records) to resolve questions of disclosure and privilege.
f) Legislation is needed to clarify the Children's Code to (1) abro-
gate the alleged perpetrator's privilege, (2) restrict disclosure of a
child's medical records to those portions relevant to the reportable in-
jury suffered by the victim, and (3) specifically preserve the child's privi-
lege as to post trauma psychological records so as to treat children in D
and N cases the same as child and adult victims in criminal cases. The
latter could partially be achieved by changing the language from "any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this part 3 . . ."
to "any proceeding brought pursuant to this part 3 .... " At a minimum,
this would limit access to and use of the child's records to D and N cases,
and not permit access in a companion criminal case. Also the Illinois
statute establishing absolute privilege for communications to rape coun-
sellors could be considered for adoption in Colorado and elsewhere.
70
VII. EPILOGUE-CASE STUDIES: DEMANDS FOR PRODUCTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
You represent a hospital where a child has been treated for non-
accidental injuries which may include sexual assault. The child has also
received post-trauma mental health treatment. Reports of suspected
abuse have been made to the local social services agency. The hospital
is served with subpoena duces tecum to produce all of the child's medical
records to:
a) the attorney for the parents in a dependency and neglect
proceeding;
b) attorney for the father in a criminal case for sexual assault
against his minor child;
c) attorney for the suspect unrelated to the child in a criminal case
for sexual assault;
d) attorney for same defendant in a civil case brought by the child's
parents for injury and emotional distress.
70. See supra notes 52 & 53.
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Are the records to be produced or should a motion to quash be
filed? Is the "medical" portion of the records to be handled differently
than the "mental health" portion? What notice, if any, is given to the
child's providers (medical and mental health) that records are being
sought? Is there any difference in outcome if the child has been seen by
a psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker? What notice, if any, is
given to parent/legal guardian that records are being sought? What no-
tice to the child? Is a hearing needed? Is in camera review of records
necessary?
e) Alternatively, you represent a healthcare provider who has
treated or counselled the parent or defendant who has provided infor-
mation about the abuse or assault. The district attorney, county attor-
ney, or child's attorney or G.A.L. subpoenas records. Are they to be
produced? Is notice, consent and/or a hearing required?
The authors recommend the following responses to the situations
presented in the case studies:
a) The parents in a D and N proceeding should be able to obtain
their child's medical treatment records pertaining to any reported in-
jury, either from the provider or Social Services. Other psychological
records should not be produced unless a 27-10-120 hearing results in a
finding that disclosure would not have a significant negative impact on
the child.
b) The father accused of sexual assault in a criminal case may re-
ceive records pertaining to the child's injuries which are also an element
of the crime with which he has been charged. However, an objection to
disclosure of any other records, including post trauma treatment, should
be made by provider and guardians and G.A.L.s, based upon privilege
and equal protection claims.
c) Defendant (stranger to the child) should not be able to obtain
any mental health records under C.R.S. § 18-3-411(5).
d) Civil case: only those records pertaining to issues in the case. If
emotional harm is a basis for a claim for damages, those records may be
ruled to be discoverable after a 27-10-120 hearing or Rule 26(c) motion
for protective orders.
e) The records of the accused may be subject to discovery without
consent in a D and N or companion criminal case. In all other cases, a
27-10-120 hearing should be employed.
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